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We study the intrapersonal relationship between trust and reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. Reciprocal subjects trust significantly more
than selfish ones. This finding raises questions about theories of social preferences which predict that “fairer” players should trust less.
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By now there seems to be broad agreement that trust and
reciprocity are conducive to economic performance and
efficiency (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997). Mutual trust between
trading parties facilitates the realization of gains from trade, for
instance by reducing contracting costs. Reciprocity can also
enhance performance in many areas of economic life, for
example by mitigating moral hazard problems (Fehr et al.,
1997). In order to better understand the economic implications
of reciprocity, several formal models of social preferences have
been developed (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Falk and
Fischbacher, 2006).
In spite of the importance of trust and reciprocity surprisingly
little is known about their relationship on an intrapersonal level.
In other words, do reciprocal persons trust more or less than
selfish ones? In this paper we address precisely this question
with the help of a controlled laboratory experiment, employing a☆ We thank Johannes Abeler, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Felix Marklein,
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doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.012variant of the trust game that allows us to measure both variables
for each individual.1
We find a strong and positive relationship between a per-
son's reciprocity and her trusting behavior. Reciprocal players
exhibit much higher levels of trust than more selfish ones, even
when personal characteristics and preferences such as gender
or risk attitudes are controlled for. This finding is also inter-
esting from a theoretical perspective because theories of social
preferences typically assume—at least implicitly—a connec-
tion between trust and reciprocity. In particular, the observed
positive relation between the two raises important questions
about theories which predict that ceteris paribus “fairer” play-
ers trust less.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section describes the design of our experiment, Section 3
presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes by dis-
cussing the implications of our findings for modelling social
preferences.1 Several studies (e.g., Cox, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006) have analyzed
behavior across games in order to disentangle subjects' unconditional kindness
or altruism from trust and reciprocity, but these studies do not look at the direct
link between a person's (own) reciprocity and trust. In addition, it is not clear to
what extent inferences can be made from behavior in non-strategic
environments (e.g., the dictator game) to players' motives in strategic
interactions. See Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a discussion of this point.
Fig. 1. Average amount sent by selfish, intermediate, and reciprocal players.
Table 1
Trust-regressions
Dependent variable: amount sent
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In our experiment, subjects were anonymouslymatched in pairs
and played a modified version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995).
Both players received an endowment of 120 points. The first mover
(the sender) could send any amount t∈{0,20,40,60,80,100,120}
to the second mover (the receiver). The amount sent was tripled by
the experimenter. Then, the second mover could send back any
amount between zero and 480 points. The crucial feature that
distinguishes our design from the original version of the trust game
is the use of the strategy method to elicit each subject's trust and
reciprocal inclination. In our experiment, subjects made decisions
both in the role of the sender and the receiver. In the role of the
receiver subjects had to decide how much to send back for any
possible amount received. This procedure allows us to measure
both the level of trust and the level of reciprocity for each subject in
the same strategic environment.2
To give subjects the monetary incentives to take all decisions
seriously while at the same time avoiding potential confounds if
subjects interact repeatedly in different roles, we employed the
following incentive-compatible procedure. After all decisions
had been made, a random mechanism determined which player
of a given pair actually had the role of the sender and which
player had the receiver role. Then, players' decisions were
implemented and subjects were paid accordingly.
The experiment was programmed with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the BonnEconLab.
Twenty subjects participated in each of the 12 sessions that
we ran so that we observe the choices of 240 different subjects.
The trust game was part of a sequence of tasks (see Dohmen and
Falk, 2006, for details). Before subjects played the trust game
they had to solve math problems under different monetary
incentives.3
After the trust game, we elicited subjects' risk preferences
using a series of 15 choices between a safe payment and a lottery.
The lottery was the same across choices (400 points or 0 points,
each with probability 0.5) while the safe option increased from
25 points to 375 points in increments of 25. If subjects have
monotonous preferences, they prefer the lottery up to a certain
level of the safe option, and then switch to preferring the safe
option in all subsequent choices. After a subject had made
decisions for all 15 choices, it was randomly determined which
choice became relevant for the payment.4 Together, the trust2 Other studies have employed the strategy method in trust games in which
subjects play only one role (e.g., Bellemare and Kröger, 2007; Falk and
Zehnder, 2007). Burks et al. (2003) have subjects play both roles but do not use
the strategy method.
3 In 4 of the 12 sessions subjects worked under purely individual incentives
(fixed wages and piece rates). In the remaining 8 sessions they could select into
an incentive scheme (team or tournament) which involved anonymous
interaction with another player. All subjects were randomly rematched in the
trust game. In view of our results we are confident that neither solving math
problems nor the different incentive schemes systematically affects the
behavior in the trust game (see below).
4 The experiment instructions as well as the full description of the
experimental procedures are available upon request.game and the lottery choice task lasted about 20–25 min and
subjects earned 6.87 Euro on average.
3. Results
Wemeasure trust by the amount that a subject sends as a first
mover. Our measure of reciprocity (also denoted “r”) is derived
as follows: for each subject, we used the decisions as a second
mover and ran a simple OLS-regression of the amounts sent
back on the (hypothetical) amounts sent by the opponent,
forcing the slope through the origin. The slope coefficient gives
us a measure of a subject's willingness to reward kind actions of
an opponent by own kind behavior, i.e., positive reciprocity. If a
receiver, for example, always matches his final payoff with that
of the sender, his reciprocity coefficient is r=2.
In order to graphically present our main result, we classify
subjects according to their behavior as second movers. We call
subjects with a reciprocity parameter rN1 “reciprocal”, and
subjects with a slope parameter r=0 “selfish”. Reciprocal types
leave their opponent with a positive return to trust, sending back
more than the amount sent to them by the sender. 64.6% of our
subjects fall into this category. Selfish types, who make up
12.5% of subjects, never send back anything, irrespective of the
first mover's behavior. The remaining 22.9% of subjects whose(1) (2) (3)
Reciprocity 16.091⁎⁎ 17.234⁎⁎ 17.761⁎⁎
(2.235) (2.199) (2.316)
1 if male 16.301⁎⁎ 15.167⁎⁎
(4.401) (4.688)
Certainty equivalent 0.100⁎
(0.044)
Constant 34.081⁎⁎ 24.329⁎⁎ 3.665
(3.957) (4.668) (10.151)
R2 adjusted 0.175 0.217 0.230
Observations 240 240 221
OLS estimates (standard errors in parentheses). “Certainty Equivalent” indicates
the switch from the risky lottery to the safe option (=0 if subject is strongly risk
averse,… , =400 if subject is strongly risk loving). Significance at the 5% and 1%
level is denoted by ⁎ and ⁎⁎ respectively.
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“intermediate” types.
Fig. 1 plots the amount that the three types of subjects send
on average in the trust game. Reciprocal types clearly send
most (69.2 points on average), and selfish types send least
(23.3 points). Subjects in the intermediate category send 43.6
points.Pairwise Mann–Whitney–U-tests indicate that all differ-
ences between the groups are highly statistically significant (all
p-valuesb0.01). Subjects who always “split the pie equally” as
a responder (i.e., subjects with r=2) trust most (83.5 points).
The result depicted in Fig. 1 is robust to different classifications
of types using a finer “grid”.
OLS-regressions of individuals' trust, measured by the
amount sent in the trust game, on their reciprocal inclination,
measured by the slope parameter r described above, confirm
that reciprocal individuals trust more: an increase of one unit in
the reciprocity measure is associated with sending 16.1 points
more in the trust game (see column 1 of Table 1).5
This key result is also robust to controlling for gender (cf.
column (2) of Table 1) and subjects' risk attitudes (cf. column
(3) in Table 1).6 The positive influence of reciprocity on trust is
highly significant and also quantitatively very similar in all
specifications. Remarkably, the effects of gender and risk
attitudes are consistent with the findings in the literature. Men
trust more than women (cf. Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004),
sending about 15 points more than female participants in our
sample. Our results also confirm the importance of risk attitudes
for trusting behavior: subjects who are more willing to take risks
send significantly more (cf. Dohmen et al., 2006).
4. Discussion and concluding remarks
The strong, positive relationship between a person's
reciprocal inclination and her trusting behavior has important
implications for the evaluation and advancement of theories that
incorporate social preferences. Some of the most prominent
models (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) predict that individuals who
are more reciprocal (or inequity averse) ceteris paribus trust
less than others in the trust game. The intuition for this result
is that a selfish sender just suffers from the loss of her invest-
ment if the receiver sends back too little, whereas a fair-minded
sender experiences additional disutility because his trust has
been exploited.7
Our results show, however, that the relationship between
trust and reciprocity may be more complex than captured by5 This result still holds if we restrict the sample to the 4 sessions in which
there was no interaction between subjects in the tasks preceding the trust game.
In addition, we find the significant positive correlation between trust and
reciprocity in the remaining 8 irrespective of the chosen incentive scheme.
6 The certainty equivalent cannot be determined unambiguously for 19
subjects because they switched more than once between the safe option and the
lottery. These subjects were excluded from the regression in column (3).
Including them with the lowest or highest switching point from the lottery to
the safe option does not change the results.
7 Along these lines, Fehr et al. (2007) have argued that “fairness preferences
inhibit trusting behavior because trust typically involves a risk of being
cheated.”most models. The finding that people trust more the more
reciprocal they are allows at least two different preliminary
interpretations—one based on norm adherence and the other on
systematic differences in beliefs. The idea of the former is that
some people value adherence to a certain moral norm in itself. If
these people follow a norm that, e.g., dictates cooperative
behavior in either role, this could account for our main finding.
Such norm-guided behavior could also help to explain why
some senders in trust games send positive amounts despite
expecting to get back less than they send (cf. Dufwenberg and
Gneezy, 2000; Ashraf et al., 2006).
A different interpretation is that fair and selfish types have
fundamentally different beliefs regarding the behavior of others.
Such differences in beliefs might be the result of a “false
consensus effect” (Kelley and Stahelski, 1970). As an extreme
example, assume that reciprocal players expect all others to
behave reciprocally, and that a selfish subject expects all others
to be selfish as well. In this case reciprocal types will send
positive amounts and expect a positive return, while selfish
types will never send anything since they expect that the receiver
will not send anything back. Such systematic differences in
beliefs would have interesting implications for the modelling of
social preferences as they require giving up the widely used
common-prior assumption. They potentially also have important
practical implications as they could lead different types of
players to select into different institutional settings. This could
help to explain why environments with different degrees of
exogenous enforcement coexist, e.g., in the labor market. Which
of the two interpretations is more relevant cannot be answered
with our data but remains an important question for future
research.
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